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Editor's note: Contitlue to e\plorc the
.oni g crisis in Decembet as PHAU\TX
e\pbrcs mathematiuL motlels, sinula
tions, warganes and eerckes in Pan tu'o
of Rits, Banqs or Buck.
fflhere is r crisiq approrching for mili-
I  Iary OR, centered on rhe role of
I iniormxtion on the batl€field. I( is
clear to military professionals that informa-
tion is becoming increasingly important,
but the OR profession's ability 1(.) measure
the conlr ibut ion of information is sl i l l
pr imit ive. We rre not good at deciding
whelher infbrmation is cost/eftective or
whether inlbrnation is more imporlanl
than firepower, and yet prccisely these
questions witl be alked more and more tre-
quently as budgets hrink.r We rre not
even sure how inlbrmation should be me&
sured - is it mersured in bils, or what?
Thc word "crisis" is not tm strong fbr our
apprcaching predicament.
The main goal of  this art ic le is to
demonstrate the crisis by surveying the
lechniques current ly avai lable. A sub-
sidiary goal is to discover an , lbslract
model thrl can serve to define thc word
' disinfirrmrtion," a word in common use.
our cl.im is that lherc is no such nodel,
and that this lack is pan oi the crisis.
Any survey oft€chniques lbr evalualing
''infbrmation" must b€ influen€ed by \lhttt
the suNeyor mems by the term. It is hard
to detine infbrmation, but the next sections
describe some altematives.
T\,vo Points about Information
Valuation
Infomdtion has only I s;ngle purpose:
to improve decision making by revealing
or panially revealing the slarc of some
process. If ihere is no decision maker, or if
the decision maker already knows every-
thing relevant, then information has no
value. This point is wonh highlighting,
since it implies ihat usetul techniques 10.
valuing infornation will have to deal with
un€enainty:
Inlonnation is oJ no t alue unless there is
an uncenain decision naker-
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ln fact, one reasonable measu.e of
informal ion is the exlenl to which i t
decreNes the decision maker's uncerlam-
ty. This observation led Sharnon in 1948
to his eleganl development of entropy tls
the most natural measure of information.z
This m€asure has many desirable proper-
ties, .rnd leads to the tundamental ideas of
chmnel capaciry and r€dundancy.
A r.lle example of entopy's use in OR
is Sherrill dnd Bar., who use entropy as.r
common scale on which to place several
information sources.r In general, opera-
lions Researchers make little use of Shan
non's iden. Perh.lps we should use il morc
oflen, but therc ffe at least wo obstacles
The first is thal entropy compul.llrons,
especially the condilional kind thai are
required in discussing the value of infor-
mation. are ofien nontrivial applications oi
Bayes Theorem that rcquire the knowledge
and use of large anays of conditioml prob-
abilities. The second obstacle is that Shan-
non's def ini t ion does not dist inguish
between rctevant and irelevant infbrma-
rion. Suppose there is 1l lllnk out there. and
you nre wondering whether to shoot al it. lt
is probably a fiiendly Blue lank (prob.rbili-
ty .9), bLrt il might be an enemy Red tank
(.1).lt also mighl have an even or odd seri-
al number, an irrelevant bit ol intbrmation,
equally likely independcnt ofcolor' which
would you rather know, the color or the
serial numbell The color, of course. but
the trouble is that the even/odd entropy is I
bi( while the color enlropy is only.469 bits
Most of the uncertainiy s aboul something
that is irctically inelevant, so it would be
wrong to seek the "mosl intbrmadve" mea-
suremenl. A distressingly large nLrmber of
military situations thll into this category,
with the comnander l^menting thal there is
too much (inelevant) data and nol enough
(relevant) information. we analysts could
imitate Shenill and Ban by confining the
analysis to relevant infomation sources, of
coulse, bul ihe relevanrinelevant classifi_
cation will not always be obvious.
If X and Y are two random variables.
then by Shannon's definjtion H(X) is the
€ntsopy of X, HCXIY=y) is the eniropy of
X given that Y is equal lo the panicular
value y. and H(XIY) is the average ntropy
of X wh€n Y is given. Think ofx as the
state of some system, and Y as information
about i1.  H(X) may be smal ler than
H(XlY=y), so it is possible fbr a specific
report to leave one more confused aboul X
than initiatly. However. for purposes of
deciding whether Y is a "good" thing to
observe, the relevant comparlson ls
between H(X) and the average value
H(X|Y). One of Shannon's theorems is
that H(X)(H(XlY) regardless or Y. In
other words, there is no soch thing as "dis-
inform0tion" if it must take lhe form of a
random !.rr iable Y for which H(X)
<H(X|Y). If disinlbrmation really exists. it
will have lo be measured on some scale
other lhm Shannon-s.
For information to have value, it is not
sufficienr that the decision tuaker be nceF
tain. Humans bave an almost insatitlble
need to be informed. We are famous lor
seeking infbrmation, even paying fbr il. in
circunstances where we are unable to us€
it to llfTect an ou(comc. Ii intbnnation is to
actually be useful, it must be collected.
processed and del ivered to a decision
maker who has the in€lindion and power
ro inlluence vents. Major GeneflrlRobert
Scales, commandant ol  lhe Army War
College, re.endy wonied thrt the el'lect of
getting more inibrmalion onto the bllltle_
l'ield might be that we would "jusl die
smarler" (nddress al AIAA. January 22,
1998). Another way of making this nega-
live point is thatl
Inlbrnation is 4 no tatue unt.st sone
.leciri ntker has the po$,?r to s. it.
This s€cond point about intbrmation is
unfonunate fbr us analysts. sinc€ the value
of information musl necessarily dep€nd on
having multiple options available to a deci
sion maker. Shannon was able to invent a
geneml measure of uncertarnty as entsopy,
but there is no corresponding contextinde-
pendent me$ure for "power." The second
point is nonetheless just as tue as the firs1.
The rest of this article is organized
according to Figure 1, which parlitions
analytic combat models according to pur-
pose (normative versus evaluative) and
level of absaacdon. "Anallaic" in fie cap-
tion means that the goal of modeling is
,nalysis rather ihan training; liat is, anal)4-
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ic nodels are by definition ultimately des-
tined to support quantitative system com-
parisons. The comparisons are explicit in
normative models and implicit in evalua-
ti,ve models ( to be enmin?A in he Decen-
bet PHAIANX: ed.), bfi arc always lhe.e.
A model $at seems to fit in several cate-
gories should be placed in the category on
$e right. The categorization does nol bear
too clos€ an inspection, but will still prove
useful in organizing the sequel.
Normative mod€ls
Deckion Theory
ln principle. the method based on utility
does il all.a The decision maker's utility
function U is first determin€d (every ratio-
nal decision mnj(er has one), and the best
decision is th€n the one that maximizes
E(U). The exp€cted value operdtor E( ) is
necessdry because U will in geneml be rnn-
dom. Therc are no restrictions on applica-
bility, so in principle the methodcould eal
with compl icated budgetary decisions
inlolving fadeoffs betwe€n bits. bangs and
bucks. A re€ent example is Br€snik.
Buede, Pisani,  Smith and Wood
(BBPSW), who apply the id€a lo na.king a
cosrbenefit analysis of va ous airborne
and spirceborne r connaissance asret
nixes.s They elicit the utility function in a
serier of  decision conterences where
experts make quant i tat ive judgements
about he imponance of various goats (e.g.
"iight and win ') and the contnbutions oi'
var iour assets (e.g. " tact ical  UAVs")
toward achieving them. The utility func-
iion is then used to sort through aboul
100,000 candidate architcctures, looking
lbr the one that makes ulility as large as
possible without exceeding a cost con-
slmint. Modern computers have made
The presence of human experts permits
BBPSW to assess lhe utility tunction with,
out explicir modeling of tactical uncerlain,
ly or decision making, since th€ experts
prcsumably make their judgements know-
ing conte*t. The explicit inclusion ofthose
fundamental features would complicate $e
analysis considerably. since optimal tacti-
cnt de.ision making will usually require a
dependence on information provided by
sensors, which cannot be known betbre-
hand even lbr a given architecture. The
classic analytic tool in such c;cumshnces
Griggs, Pamell and Lehmkuhl (CPL)
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Figur€ l  The Analytic Combaa Modeling Sp€.trum
Arrow prop€rties apply to cverything in ahe indic{ted direction.
is a good example of the use of decision
trees.6 The core of CPL is a Mix€d-lnte-
ger-Progmn (MlP) that maximizes E(toral
target value destroyed minus total value of
lhe aircratl lost in the process), with the
quantity in parentheses being the utility
function. The CPL decision maler has no
uncerl^inly rbout inputs in the core prob-
lem. simply using the MIP to select the
best possible Air T$king Order (ATO).
But GPL do explore one dinretsion of
uncenainty - the wcather may be Good,
Marginal or Bad, rnd there may be a fbre-
casl available. TheMIP is first solved three
t imes. once with drta relevart  to each
wealher st|ie, thus obtajning lhree distinct
ATOS md three utilities. Weather fbrecasrs
llre lhen intrcduced, bgelher with a table
ol'conditional probabilities rhat the actual
wealher it one thing when the fbrecast is
mother. A backwdrds rollup is then per-
ibrmed to conclude that drc best warfight-
ing policy is to use the Cood ATO when
fie forecast is "Cood, and so on. The opti-
mized objective luncdon is 139.7, to be
precise, an improvemenl over the | 19.4
lhat GPL show to be possible without the
fbrecast. The difference is 20.3. Thus the
value of the fbrecast has been quantified.
which is exac y lhe kind of thing that we
need to be able to do.
Bul GPL nole of decision rrees that
"they get very cumbersome fbr complex
de.isions." The CPL tree has I 8 leaves, fol
each of which a value must be established.
(there would be 27 leaves ex€ept fbr the
GPL assumption that weather stales can be
ordered so thal an ATO optimal for one
weather stare is equally effective in any-
lhing bener). Il there were / wealher fore-
casts, d possible decisions, and D weather
states, there would be/dw leaves. Funher'
more, sinc€ ther€ is in general no guarantee
that the best warf ight ing pol icy fbr
unknown we her will always be one of
those pol ic ies thai  is opt imal when the
wealher type is known,./ is in pnnciple the
same as the number of slrategies in the
MIP! The size of the tree becomes awk-
wdrdly large very qui€kly. lt is not just :r
pmblem ofgnphically dcscribing the trce.
To solve lhe (i4'e) problem, it would be
necessary lo firsl solve/ distinct MIPS,
wilh the objective tunction in each case
involving the probabilities hown in lhe
deepesl level of the decision tree. In every
direction we see the possibility lbr explo-
$ive growth in the di f f icul ty of even
descnbing the problem, much less solving
i t .
Decision trees arc usef-ul concepts, but
wilhoul rpproximations ol the type that
GPL employ lhey ffc certainly not going to
averl the coming information modeling cri-
sis. The basic problem is lhal the decision
maker musl in elTecl delermine a policy
thaf specifies the decision dr a lunctio oJ
the inJormation. There are i/ fun€tions that
map i intbrmation possibiliti€s onto./ deci-
sion altematives, a cnlastrophically arge
number for realistic values of i and d. In
most cases this means that the best policy
cannol be found by exhaustion. Some kind
of special structure must be imposed if we
afe to have any chance of pronouncing a
policy 'optimal."
Represent ing the problem with an
influence djagrarn Inay be more efficient
graphically ihan using a d€.ision tlee. but
does not change this tundamental dirrcul
ry.7 lf the decision does no. depend on the
infbrmation. then lhe information is value-
less. If it does dep€nd on $e information,
then finding the best manner of that depen-
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fundion. Ihis tendency for functions to be
at the hean of the matter is the fundamenral
dif6culty in valuing informadon.
One final point: Decision Theorists
have introduced a quant i ty cal led the
Exp€cted Value of Sample Informalion
(EVSI).8 EVSI will be zero if rhere is no
uncenainty is rhe first place or if tie opti-
mal decision do€s not depend on the infor-
mation. so EVSI conforms lo the two
points about valuing information men-
tioned earlier. Bul there is a theorem to the
eftecl thal EVSI cannot be negalive. The
question pelsists. th€n: "What is disinfor-
marion?" There seems to be no way to
demonstmte the phenomenon i the con-
text ol either Informalion Theory or Deci-
sion Thmry.
Optirni.alion Modeli
Optimization models can be thoughl ol-
as applications of Decision Theory, since
there is a utility function (objective func-
tion) and a set of feasible decisions, but
opt imizat ion models general ly exploi l
some sp€cial stucture that permits an opti-
mal solution to be found in spite oi'a large
or even inflnite set of tbasible solulions.
Amazingly large mathemalical programs
can be solved these days, including the
Mixed Integer Program s.udied by GPL.
The crnerging subfield of Slochastic pro-
gramming lllows lbr $e randomness that
inlbrmalion-Nsessment models typically
require.9 The trick is to avoid havilg to
deal wilh an explosion in lhe number ol
ln marhematical  programmiog ap-
proaches, an explosion in lhe number oi
informalion states will take the form of an
explosion in lhe number of v.fiables. An
example of how this explosion can be
avoided is provided by the Conventional
Forces Analysis Model (CFAM), the cur-
rent heir apparent to models such as TAM,
MIXMASTER. HEAVY ATTACK and
othe$ that have been used by the Air Force
(USAF) for analyzing the air-to ground
battle-I0 Unlike its predecessors, CFAM
includes enor probabilities for Battle Dam-
age Assessment (BDA), an aspect of the
iir{o-ground battle that the advent of
expensive precision weapons has made
especially imponant.
The general idea in CFAM is that a cer
uin ftaction of strikes at live hrgets result
in erroneous "live" reports, that such tar-
g€ts must be struck again at the next oppor-
tunity. along with those tbat are truly alive,
and that the restrike will conectly rev€al
the target's status. The imponant points
aboul this description are that the policy
about restrik€s is legislated rather than
oprimiz€d. and that the legishnon prevents
iarget status from kcoming loo complicat-
ed. The former means that de.ision vari-
ables do not need to have a strik€r'r€sirike
subscript. The latter means that the set of
tirgets does not explode through having 1()
keep lrack ofthe probabiliry ofbeing alive,
since lhe status of the target is known in all
circumstances where a choi€e is permjtted.
Such measures to limil scale are necessary
in a model $at is already computationally
stressed through having to keep track of
many types of aircraft, weapon, hrget,
loadout and delivery profile. The pur?ose
of CFAM is thus not to det€rmine how
inibrmation rrrrl./ infl uence decision
making, but only 1o measure the impli€d
consequences ofa paftlcular imposed eci-
sion rule. CFAM'S predecessors have long
been in use by USAF for investigating
hdeot|\ between inventories of aircrafl
and weapons. CFAM now exlends this
capability in the sense thnt the implications
of changing the BDA probability are also
Mathematical progmms uch as CFAM
have many virtues lbr making tradeoff
analyses, includirg the imporlant virtue
that the optimized ecision isautomatically
adapted to new technologies and invento'
des. However, ihe tendency lbr the nunber
of variables to explode is still lurking in tle
wings once the goals are expanded to
include policy oplimization. CFAM's han-
dling of BDA provides one example of
how to avoid this explosion. The following
paragraphs outline some additional merh-
ods that are in common enough use io
. Expecred-value Analysis (EVA)
EVA refers to any analysis that consis-
lently replaces random variables with their
expected values. In CFAM'S case, EVA
enoers when the number of sorties implied
by th€ decision b saike a target is calculat
ed as an expected value Che actual number
is random due to random BDA results,
among other reasont. This expected value
is then accumulated and compared to an
overall constraint to determine feasibility.
thus ignoring the hctical question of what
hisbric and bedutiful Fon Leavenworth,
KnnMs overlooking the majeslic Missouri
River. Steve Pilnick, is ofi to a Sreal stan
Lrs Program Ch.ir. Steve has organized a
very talented, energetic statf who are herd-
ing up volunte€n for the trip west to lhe
heart land of Anrer ic.  for what wi l l  be
another great symposium. Wagons Holl
See yoo at Fon l,eavenworlh.
ADM Clark Bets the MORS Coveted
Atryli. Paperyeight, as h,e as the 69th
MORSS T-shirt and nut, lor a job wetl
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!o do if ill luck on the filst severul targets
consumes an unexpeciedly lrrge amount of
resources. Whether EVA is harmless
depends on circumstances, but, since fte
optimal use of relevant information can be
expected to inply variability in resource
consumption. the consistent use of EVA in
problems involving information is certain-
. Time Reveals All (TRA)
In optimization models that include a
succession of time p€riods or stages, il is
corrunon 10 assume implicitly or explicidy
that passage from one period to another
provides a fresh stffl where the status of all
entiti€s is known at the beginning of lhe
new period. The Stochastic progmm with
recourse is a onc stage example where the
trulh about o€rtain random variables is
r€veuled only after the anticipative pan of
the decision has been made. aller which the
rcaclive pnn offte decision is mnde in the
knowledge of these lrue values.9
EVA and TRA oflen go together in
multi-stage problems. For example, sup-
pose there are 1000 targets al  t ime 0,
opposed by 3000 welpons with kill proba-
bi l i ty .5.  Suppose further thal  the f i rst
Atlack commits two weapons to each lar-
get,  k i l l ing I000(l- .52) and leaving 250
targets tbr the remaining 1000 weapons in
the next l ime period. So far this is un
example of EVA. but in addition the ld?nti-
n ofthe remaining 250live targe$ and 750
dead targets is lypicnlly assumed to be
known; ihat is, it is assumed that the Pas-
sage ol time will reveal the status of each
targel. How else could one assign weapons
|o the 250 tive tdrgets in the next p€riod?
The inplied assumption is that the infor_
mation system responsible for monitoring
the targel siates is perfect between penods:
that is, "Time Reveals A11." The almost
irresislible .rnalytical advantage of the
TRA assumpiion is that the situation al
lime I is just a reduced-scale version of the
siruation at time 0. The assumption has
always been wrong, since in rcaiity contu-
sion about identity as well as numbers
moves across time period boundaies. Bul
lhe TRA assumption can be seriot'sly
wrong in an era of tong-range, expensive
weapons thai very much depend on knowl-
edge of target slatus.
The TRA assumption can be made
more plausible by allowing for imptied
inforrnaiion resources. ln lhe previous
example dle 1000 attack in tlle first period
PIIALANX
might have to be accompanied by 1000
inspections of some kind. ln effect, infbr-
mation enterc the model as a "tax on
atiempts at target destruction. Again, lhe
policy for using information is highly sim-
plified and legislated. rath€r than opli-
EVA and TRA do not nec€ssaflly come
togelher. Evans reports an interestrng
example of an analysh lhat employs EVA
but not TRA in investigating a multi_stage
war where BDA sensors make both type t
and rype 2 enots.r t He concludes that 
'It
is easy to simulate pefect BDA or nonex-
istent BDA. bul it is hard to model flawed
BDA." That statemcnl is all too troe.
. lnteresting Rheostat Knobs (lRKs)
The exlreme cases where info.mation is
perfect or conlpletely absent ure oflen
much simpler than intermediate cases. It is
therefore tempting 10 simply include a tun'
ing parameter as a bridge between well_
understood extremes. HEAVY ATTACK'$
c+nctor is an example of this. HEAVY
ATTACK is a nonl inear opt imizat ion
hecause the probability olkilling a brget is
nonlinetrly related to the numb€r of rllo-
cated sorties x by the fbrmula:
Px=min { ( l -exp(-.ar)) / . ,  I  } ; . r> 0,
where a represents a sort ie 's lethal i ly
agains! a particular kind of target and c is a
piuamel€r between 0 and l.l2 When c=1.
the formula represents he familiar expo-
nential relationship characteristic of inde-
pendent shots. This is what one would
expecr with zero information about target
status between shots. ln the l imit  as c
approaches 0, the expression is min(ax, I ).
a linear increase that h poss;ble only when
the infbrmation system is so good that no
sonie is ever directed agrinsl a target that
has alre.rdy been killed. Inlermediate cases
are presumably represented by the open
interval 0<€<1. The trouble wi lh this
approach is that c is not well described
except in the extremes, since there is no
combat lheory that would permit c to be
measured. After al l .  c2 is a number
betwe€n 0 ,nd I just as nuch as c is. but
(except in the extrem€s) the formula would
certainly behave differently if c2 were snb
stituled for c. Questions such as. "What is
the c-factor for tanks being aitacked by A-
l0's?" nre therefore essentially unanswer-
able. This maker the c-factor an IRK, and
HEAVY ATTACK has been criticized lbr
havingone. l0l l  l2
Models that deal with infbrmation are
espe.ially inclined to include IRKS, since
the extremes are especially simple com-
pared to intermediate cases. This is fue of
optimization models, but it is also true of
other tess absiracl types. The documenta-
tion for TACWAR, a combat model in cur-
rent use by the Joiht Chiefs of Staff,
defines C2 capability to be "A measure-
ment of a unit  or element s abi l i ty to
r€ceive, assimilate and act on information
and orders from internal and exlernal
resources," l3 How would one measure
that, or make a falsifiable statement about
i1? Until the definition is made operdtional.
"C2 capabiliq," is m IRK.
The drgument for IRKS is that they can
be adjusted unlil results agree with the
expectntions of experts, and that anywry
there is no other choice. These are power_
ful argumenls that should nol be rejecled
until better ahemrtives ar€ available. The
counternrgumenl is thal it is hdrd 10 leam
much liom a madel if its IRKS are simply
adjusted to fit preconceptions, nnd that
IRKS rrc dangerors in being m invitible
way to ndjust a model to prove whatever
nec€ssity dictales. This is a powerful coun-
terargrmenl. As a pmclicnl m|tler we are
stuck with IRK| for the monent, bul we
need to develop belter dternntives.
Prohsbilitti. Dfnanic
Pogm,nning eDP)
This class of model would seem to be
nlrtural for problems where military infor-
malion must be valued. Winston gives a
good exposition.s The decision makeis
actior scl can include both shooting at a
target ("bangs") and seeking information
about its status ("bits"). eacb of which can
be more or less costly. and funhermore the
resulting policies are provably optimal.
PDP deals well with prcblems where de.i
sion making and infonnation acquisition
are intermixed in time. which is character
istic of many military prcblems. lnforma_
tion has all the subtle usrges and implica-
tions $al it does in rerlity.
One example is Aviv and Kress, who
use PDP to determine oplimal firing poLi
cies in a problem where the information
received afur each altack is error prone. rq
Another is Brodheim, Herzer and Russ,
who use PDP to sotve a weapon allocation
problem where weapons can either be
(s?e CRISIS, p. 26)
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assigned irectly to taigets or to a radar
system that provides information to a sys-
tem thal defends the targets.l5
Unfortunately, PDP suffers from the
"Curse of Dimensionality."to Suppose
there are 100 targets, each of which is
eirher live or dead. The tolal number of
ways of describing lhe status of the targea
se1 is *len 2lm. This is far too large a num-
ber ior any computer in the foreseeable
future to deal with by exhaustion, and il
would be still larger if there were more
than two possibililies for the status ofeach
target. This explosive tendency of the state
spdce explains the lack of applications of
PDP to large-scale military models, in spite
of its other attmciive features. Brodheim,
Herzer and Russ assume TRA and that
damage assessment is perfect. thus permit-
ling tle state of $e radar system to be lhe
number of surviving rldars rather than a
vector with .| survival probability lbr each
one.15 Without hat assumption, an llppli-
c,rlion oI PDP to their problem would be
In spne of this limited record to date,
PDP deser.r'es more atl€ntion fbr problems
oi inlbrm.{ion valuation. lll virtues b€g us
lo lind some way oi outwitting Bellman's
curse by naking sp€cial assumptions. Yost
has described a large air-to-ground weapon
rllocation problem thar can be altacked by
x hybrid sequential method involving bollr
Linear programming and a (part ial ly
observable) PDP.I? See also Yost and
washburn.l8 The PDP generates good
policies by dealinS with individual targels,
and the Linear pfogmm finds an oplimal
mixture of the policies with associated dual
resource costs for th€ PDP. Dynamic pro-
gnrns d€al with rin" efficiently, and time
is of soch central importance lo lhe value
of miliiary infbrmation thal PDP willeven-
lually become attractive.
Heuri:ti! Mefiods
Miniaturization of sensors and transmit 
iers increases the amount of information
available on the modem battlefield, and the
widespread availability of microprocessors
pemits that information to affect tactics.
The same proliferation makes it difficult to
control things "oplimally,' so approxi-
mately optimal solutions may inslead have
to be sought. It could be that heuristic
methods, rather than exact optimization,
PHALANX
will become modal.
If the decision theoretic tendency is
going to be towards heuristics. then the
Operations Research (OR) field has some
catching up to do. Artificial Intelligence
(Al) is senerally perceived to be part of
Computer Science. rather than OR, and
much of the development of heuris.ics has
occuned within AI. While heuristics are
well reprEsented in ttle OR literature. they
are not regarddd as fundamental and are
Iikely to be given cu$ory treatrnent in oR
textbooks. For example only about I per-
cent of Winston or Taha. is devoted to
h€uristcs, and $efl in the context of specif-
ic optimization problem$ such as the lrav-
elling sai€sman problem.s,re Rardin does
include a discussion of general purpose
heuristic oplimization te€hniques such as
labu search, simulated anneal ing a'rd
genetic algorithms, but only a fiaction ofa
chapter in a textbmk devoted to optimiza-
tion.zo Constrainl Programming is not
mentioned in any of tbese books. nor are
neuml networks.2l Simon regrets how AI
tnd OR have become separated, and rec-
ommends that we "mix them up' so that
each may benefit fmm the other.!? There
has b€en sonrc progress. but lherc is slill n
rong way lo go.
Even a heuristic approach to optimiza'
t ion st i l l  involves an expl ic i t  objecr ive
j-unclion and a sel of feasible decisions.
When those concepts disappear, as they
may in sutliciently complicated problems,
the overall approach to decision making
becomes evaluative 'athel than normalive
in the parlance of Figure l. S€ction three
of this adcle is devoted 1o models of this
type. Elements of goal-seeking behavior
may rcmarn, bul the id€a of opti nl heh^v -
ior must disappear rvilh the concepls.
Gane Theory
Much of ihe uncertainty in mi l i tary
operations, and therefore much of lhe need
for information, comes tiom the unpre-
dictabiliry of enemy activiti€s. The theore!
ical justification of this unpredictability is
again due to von Neumann, who proved
that every finite Two-Person-Zero-Sum
(TIvzS) game has a value as lons as ran-
domized strategies are permitted.23 ln
principle this source of uncerlainty can be
handled by formulating the decision prob-
lem as a game, th€n using the game value
to make tradeofis between bits, bangs and
bucks. The game value's autornatic adjusG
ment of enemy tactics to account for stslc-
tural changes is particularly attractive,
since that valuable feature is otherwise
had to come by.
Markov games are a special kind of
TPZS model especially well suited to mod
eling military decision problems extended
in time. The odginal paper along these
lines h Berkovitz and Dresher, who con-
sider a campaigll of eight periods, in each
of which an air force must be panilioned
into counter-air, air-defense and ground-
support components in ignorance of similar
decisions made by the other side.24 A
more modern representative of the class
would be the Optimum Marginal Evaluator
(OMEIV) model, in which the rcles and
resources of the opponents are consider-
.1bly generalized.25
Unfortunately, Markov games nlso run
rp rgainsi Bellman's €urse. h fact, the
solution technique usually employs a func-
t ional equat ion very simi lar lo the one
employed in PDP. we .rr€ thereforc iorccd
to come to thc same conclusion, namely
lhat Markov games arc a potentially useful
model class thnt will requirc cl€venress in
formulalion in order to Avoid computation-
alroadblocks.
TPZS ganes :u€ normdly represent€d
as m.rtrices where the row player des 10
maximize nnd the column player tries to
minimize. There is nolhing wrong concep
tually wlth letrinS rhe rows and columns be
funclions thal represent different ways of
proccssing and rc1ing on information, so
we crn agdn lsk the queslion. "ls there
any kind of in lormation fbr which the
game value goes down if a player has it?"
lf so. rhen we have discovered isinfbrma-
The idea of disintbrmation is often con-
nected iltuitively with a situation where
signals jiorn one player lead the o$er play-
er to a false conclusion about (say) tt'e pay-
off matrix. Abstsact versions of lhis situa-
t ion have been studied: a distr ibut ion
known lo both sides determines which of
several payoff matrices is operddve, bul the
index determining the payoff matrix is
known ody to player 1.26 If player 1 is
not careful. his choice of strategy may
reveal his knowledge of the index. Player
l s choice of a strategy thal conceals
knowledge of the index might even be
describ€d as ' disinformative." However. it
remains true that player 2 is better off o,1
the avercEe (^nd ir is averages that are
September 200l
important) knowing player I's strategy
choice. even though there will of couse be
instances where he will regret having the
information. Once again, the idea ofinfor-
matjon that is acrually bad to possess
proves elusive (see also Rasmussen).27
h seems that the id€a of "disinforma
rion" cannot be demonslrated within the
confines of Information, De.ision or Game
Theory. The widespread use of the term
implies a need for a theory within whjch it
can be represented. The challenge is lo
find such a lheory.
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